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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Does the anti-retaliation provision in section 
15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act apply to 
retaliation by an employer against a job applicant?
(2) Is the private cause action provided by sec­
tion 16(b) of the FLSA available to a job applicant 
who is retaliated against by an employer?
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1Petitioner Natalie R. Dellinger respectfully prays 
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the 
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals entered on August 12, 2011.
-------------------- ♦-----------------
OPINIONS BELOW
The August 12, 2011 opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, which is reported at 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 
2011), is set out at pp. la-26a of the Appendix. The 
October 7, 2011 order of the Court of Appeals denying 
rehearing en banc, which is not reported, is set out at 
p. 40a of the Appendix. The April 2, 2010 Memoran­
dum Opinion of the District Court, which is unoffi­
cially reported at 2010 WL 1375263 (E.D.Va.), is set 
out at pp. 27a-39a of the Appendix.
-------------------- +---------------------
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered 
on October 7, 2011. This Court has jurisdiction pur­
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
--------------♦--------------
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 3(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 203(a), provides:
“Person” means any individual, partnership,
association, corporation, business trust, legal
2representative, or any organized group of 
persons.
Section 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), provides in pertinent part 
“ ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an 
employer.”
Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), provides in pertinent part:
(a) ... [I]t shall be unlawful for any person -
* * %
(3) to discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any employee 
because such employee has filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding under or 
related to this chapter, or has testified 
or is about to testify in any such pro­
ceeding....
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b), provides in pertinent part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of 
section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable 
for such legal or equitable relief as may be 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of sec­
tion 215(a)(3) of this title, including without 
limitation employment, reinstatement, pro­
motion, and the payment of wages lost and 
an additional equal amount as liquidated 
damages. An action to recover the liability 
prescribed in ... the preceding sentence[]
3may be maintained against any employer 
(including a public agency) in any Federal or 
State court of competent jurisdiction by any 
one or more employees for and in behalf of 
himself or themselves and other employees 
similarly situated.
-------------------- ♦--------------------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition concerns a startling Fourth Circuit 
decision which the government has correctly described 
as creating an “untenable gap in [the] coverage”1 
provided by the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. A sharply divided court of 
appeals has held that the FLSA permits an employer 
to expressly refuse to hire any job applicant who has 
ever filed a suit under the FLSA or complained to the 
Department of Labor. That decision poses a serious 
threat to the enforceability of the FLSA, and frames 
an important question of law which should be settled 
by this Court.
In July 2009 petitioner Dellinger brought suit 
against her former employer, CACI, Inc., for alleged 
violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime 
provisions. About the same time she applied for a 
job with the defendant, Science Applications Inter­
national Corporation. In late August 2009, Science 
Applications offered Dellinger a position, contingent
1 Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4.
4on her passing a drug test, completing certain forms, 
and verifying and transferring her security clearance. 
Dellinger accepted the offer and began the process of 
satisfying the contingencies. (App. 3a, 28a).
Dellinger filled out the required forms and passed 
the drug test. On one form which Science Applica­
tions required her to complete, Dellinger was asked to 
identify any pending civil litigation to which she was 
a party. She listed her then pending FLSA action 
against CACI, Inc. Several days after Dellinger sub­
mitted her completed form, Science Applications with­
drew its offer of employment. (App. 3a, 29a). Science 
Applications gave Dellinger no explanation for its 
decision to cancel the job offer it had made to her only 
days earlier.
Dellinger commenced this action against Science 
Applications, alleging that it had retaliated against 
her by withdrawing its job offer because of her FLSA 
lawsuit against CACI.2 The plaintiff asserted that 
Science Applications’ action violated section 15(a)(3) 
of the Act, which forbids retaliation in reprisal for the 
assertion of rights under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 215(a)(3).
Science Applications moved to dismiss the com­
plaint for failure to state a claim. It contended that 
15(a)(3) permits a prospective employer to reject a job
2 The FLSA action against CACI was settled in January 
2010.
5applicant because he or she had previously filed an 
action under the FLSA. The District Court granted 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The 
district judge held that a job applicant is not an 
“employee” within the meaning of the FLSA,3 and 
thus is not entitled to the protections of section 
15(a)(3). (App. 31a, 34a-35a).
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 
The central issue on appeal was whether Dellinger 
was an “employee” within the meaning of the FLSA. 
Section 15(a)(3) forbids retaliation against “any em­
ployee” and the remedial provision of the Act, section 
16(b), authorizes suits by “any employee.” A majority 
of the court of appeals held that “employee” means 
only an individual who is “in an employment relation­
ship with” the employer that is alleged to have vio­
lated section 15(a)(3) and that is sued under section 
16(b). (App. 7a). The Fourth Circuit therefore con­
cluded that a job applicant (such as Dellinger) is not 
an employee. “This presents the question of whether 
an applicant for employment is an ‘employee’.... [W]e 
conclude that ... an applicant is not an employee.” 
(App. 6a).
3 App. 31a (“Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show 
that she was an ‘employee’ of [Science Applications] within the 
meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)”), 35a (“Without reading be­
yond the plain language of the statute, a job applicant cannot be 
considered an ‘employee.’ ”).
6Although she was an applicant for employ­
ment with Science Applications and her 
application had been approved on a con­
tingent basis, she never began work.... [A]n 
applicant who never began or performed any 
work could not, by the language of the FLSA, 
be an ‘employee.’
(App. 8a).
Based on its view that a job applicant is not an 
“employee” within the scope of the FLSA, the panel 
majority ruled that section 15(a)(3) “permit[s] future 
employers effectively to discriminate against prospec­
tive employees for having exercised their rights under 
the FLSA in the past.” (App. 11a). “[W]e hold that the 
FLSA anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), 
does not authorize prospective employees to bring 
retaliation claims against prospective employers.” 
(App. 12a). “Congress was ... providing protection to 
those in an employment relationship with their em­
ployer.” (App. 6a-7a; see App. 10a (insisting there is 
no authority for “extend[ing] FLSA protections to 
applicants or prospective employees.”))
The panel majority also held that, regardless of 
whether an employer engaged in conduct which vio­
lated the rights of a job applicant, section 16(b) of the 
FLSA does not authorize prospective employees to file 
lawsuits against employers. “[W]e conclude that the 
FLSA gives an employee the right to sue only his or 
her current or former employer and that a prospec­
tive employee cannot sue a prospective employer.” 
(App. 2a-3a). “[T]here is ... no remedy for an employee
7to sue anyone but his employer for violations of the 
anti-retaliation provision.” (App. 9a).
Because an employee is given remedies ... 
only from an employer, Dellinger could only 
sue Science Applications if she could show 
that she was an employee and that Science 
Applications was her employer. Yet Dellinger 
cannot make that showing.
(App. 7a-8a) (emphasis added). “§216(b) provides that 
... employees may sue only their employers for retali­
ation.” (App. 7a) (emphasis added and omitted).
Judge King dissented. The term “employee,” he 
argued, is sufficiently ambiguous that it could include 
a prospective employee. (App. 17a, 18a). Because sec­
tion 15(a)(3) was intended to prevent fear of reprisals 
from deterring workers from asserting their rights 
under the FLSA, Judge King reasoned, section 15(a)(3) 
should be construed to forbid retaliation against pro­
spective employees, and section 16(b) should be in­
terpreted to authorize civil actions by prospective 
employees. (App. 23a-25a). The majority opinion, 
Judge King objected, was inconsistent with this 
Court’s interpretation of the term “employee” in 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). (App. 
12a, 14a).
Dellinger filed a timely petition for rehearing en 
banc. On October 7, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied 
the petition for rehearing. (App. 40a).
8The Department of Labor, together with the 
EEOC,4 filed a brief in the original appeal5 and a 
second brief with regard to the petition for rehearing 
en banc.6 Both briefs contended that section 15(a)(3) 
forbids an employer from retaliating against job ap­
plicants and that section 16(b) provides a private 
cause of action to a job applicant who was the victim 
of such retaliation. In its brief regarding rehearing 
en banc, the government argued that the panel 
opinion was inconsistent with this Court’s decisions 
in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. and several other cases. 
(See pp. 14-15, 20-21, infra).
--------------♦--------------
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Fourth Circuit has held that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act permits an employer to retaliate 
against a job applicant for having filed an action 
under the Act, and provides to job applicants no cause 
of action against a retaliatory employer. The govern­
ment has correctly described that court of appeals
4 The EEOC joined these briefs because complaints and 
legal actions under the Equal Pay Act are protected by the anti­
retaliation provision of section 15(a)(3) and the private cause of 
action in section 16(b).
5 Brief for the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellant (“Department of Labor Merits Brief”).
6 Brief for the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae (“Department of 
Labor Rehearing Brief”).
9opinion as threatening to “drastically weaken the 
FLSA’s anti-retaliation protection.”7
Enforcement of the wage and hour and overtime 
provisions of the Act depends upon “information and 
complaints received from employees seeking to vindi­
cate rights claimed to have been denied.” Mitchell v. 
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 
(1960). The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA is 
essential to that enforcement machinery, because 
“fear of economic retaliation” would otherwise induce 
workers whose rights had been violated to avoid 
complaining to or cooperating with the Department of 
Labor and to refrain from filing lawsuits seeking 
redress for those statutory violations. Id. The Fourth 
Circuit decision in the instant case expressly permits 
the use of just such economic retaliation by prospec­
tive employers. As the dissenting judge emphasized 
in the court below, the panel majority “giv[es] its 
thumbs-up to the company’s conduct and pav[es] the 
way for other employers to adopt similar practices.” 
(App. 14a).
The Fourth Circuit’s decision is inconsistent with 
this Court’s interpretation of the term “employee” in 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Corp. The court of appeals’ 
insistence that section 15(a)(3) protects an individual 
only from retaliation by his or her employer is in con­
flict with decisions of the Third, Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits. The Fourth Circuit’s express legalization of
7 Department of Labor Merits Brief, p. 21.
10
retaliation against job applicants poses a serious 
threat to the enforcement of the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act, and presents legal issues which should be 
settled by this Court.
I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF AP­
PEALS CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS 
OF THIS COURT
A. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S “EMPLOY­
MENT RELATIONSHIP” REQUIREMENT 
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S DE­
CISION IN ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL 
CO.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision rests on its insist­
ence that the term “employee” necessarily refers only 
to an individual who is “in an employment relation­
ship” with the employer in question. (App. 7a). In 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), this 
Court unanimously rejected that very interpreta­
tion of “employee.” Both the government and the 
dissenting judge below correctly objected that the 
panel decision conflicts with this Court’s decision in 
Robinson. See Sup.Ct. Rule 10(c). Judge King insisted 
that “Robinson mandates the opposite result from 
that reached by the majority today.” (App. 14a) (dis­
senting opinion).8 The Department of Labor objected
8 “Ms. Dellinger’s construction of the word ‘employee’ in 
§ 215(a) is ... compelled by Robinson.” (App. 22a) (King, J., dis­
senting). “[T]he majority ... ignores Robinson.” (App. 21a) (King, 
J., dissenting).
11
that “the majority decision departs from [the] analy­
sis [in Robinson]” (Department of Labor Rehearing 
Brief, pp. 3-4).9
Robinson concerned the interpretation of the term 
“employees” in Title VII. The plaintiff in Robinson 
had complained about unlawful action by his former 
employer, and then been retaliated against when he 
sought a job with a new employer. Robinson, like 
Dellinger, had no current employer at the point in 
time when the retaliation occurred. This Court none­
theless held that Mr. Robinson was an “employee[]” 
under Title VII, which defines “employee” in terms 
essentially identical to the definition in the FLSA.10 
The Court’s decision in Robinson rested on the ambi­
guity of the word “employee,” 519 U.S. at 340-45, and 
on the danger that workers would be afraid to com­
plain about unlawful employment practices if such 
complaints could lead to retaliation that would pre­
vent them from finding future employment. 519 U.S. 
at 345-46. This Court’s decision in Robinson reversed 
a Fourth Circuit opinion which had held that “em­
ployee” refers only to a current employee. 70 F.3d 325 
(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The situation in the instant
9 Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 11 (“[t]he major­
ity did not apply the Supreme Court’s statutory analysis of the 
term ‘employees’ ... [i]n Robinson”).
10 Section 701(f) of Title VII defines an employee as “an 
individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 
Section 3(e)(1) of the FLSA defines employee as “any individual 
employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
12
case differs from Robinson only in that here the re­
taliation was by a prospective employer, whereas in 
Robinson the retaliation was by the plaintiff’s former 
employer.
In Robinson the defendant contended that the 
term “employee” necessarily refers only to an individ­
ual who is in an “employment relationship” with the 
employer in question.
[T]he statute does contain [a] bright-line 
test. And that bright line is whether or not 
you have an employment relationship.... [I]f 
you do not have an ongoing employment re­
lationship, I don’t see how you can be covered 
by the statute.
1996 WL 656475 at *34-*35 (transcript of oral argu­
ment). The Fourth Circuit’s now overturned 1995 
decision in Robinson was similarly based on that cir­
cuit’s insistence that “employee” refers to an existing 
employment relationship. The en banc majority in 
Robinson repeatedly asserted that the term “employ­
ee” means an individual who is in an “employment 
relationship” with the defendant. The Fourth Circuit 
in Robinson repeated the phrase “employment rela­
tionship” ten times11 in explaining its interpretation 
of “employee.” 70 F.3d at 330-31. “The term ‘employed’ 
...is commonly used to mean ‘performing work under 
an employer-employee relationship.’ ” 70 F.3d at 330 
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990)).
11 70 F.3d at 330-31.
13
The Fourth Circuit in Robinson refused to construe 
the protection afforded to an “employee” by the anti­
retaliation provision of Title VII to reach “beyond the 
employment relationship.” 70 F.3d at 331. “If Con­
gress intended Title VII to remedy [retaliatory] 
discrimination beyond the employment relationship, 
then it could have easily done so....” 70 F.3d at 330.
This Court, however, expressly rejected in Robin­
son the argument that “employee” necessarily refers 
only to those “in an employment relationship” with 
the employer in question.
At first blush, the term “employees” ... would 
seem to refer to those having an existing 
employment relationship with the employer 
in question.... This initial impression, how­
ever, does not withstand scrutiny....
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
In the teeth of this Court’s specific rejection of 
the Fourth Circuit’s 1995 holding that “employee” 
means an individual in an “employment relationship” 
with the employer in question, the Fourth Circuit in 
the instant case resurrected and applied that very 
discredited interpretation. In a decision written by 
one of the Fourth Circuit judges who earlier joined 
that 1995 Fourth Circuit opinion, the majority opinion 
below held that “by using the term ‘employee’ ... Con­
gress was referring to the employer-employee rela­
tionship, ... and was therefor providing protection to 
those in an employment relationship with their em­
ployer.” (App. 6a-7a). To be protected by the FLSA,
14
the majority insisted, an individual must “have an 
employment relationship with the defendant.” (App. 
10a). The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA only 
applies “within the employer-employee relationship.” 
(App. 10a).
The now-overruled 1995 Fourth Circuit decision 
in Robinson had insisted that this limitation on the 
application of the term “employee” was dictated by 
“the plain meaning of [the] unambiguous statutory 
language.” 70 F.3d at 329; see 70 F.3d at 330 (“em­
ployee” “is not ambiguous”). But this Court emphati­
cally rejected that claim. General usage of the term 
“employee,” the Court held, “tends to rebut a claim 
that the term ‘employee’ has some intrinsically plain 
meaning.” 519 U.S. at 344 n.4. Robinson expressly 
pointed out that “employee” could “mean ‘prospective 
employee! ].’ ” 519 U.S. at 343 n.3. The Court con­
cluded that in the context of Title VII, which defines 
“employee” in language essentially identical to the 
FLSA, the term is indeed ambiguous. 519 U.S. at 343, 
345, 346.
Despite this aspect of the Court’s 1997 decision in 
Robinson, the Fourth Circuit in the instant case again 
insisted that the requirement that an FLSA plaintiff 
be in an employment relationship with the employer 
in question is literally dictated by the “plain terms” of 
the statute. (App. 11a). The government correctly de­
scribed the conflict between the panel decision below 
and this Court’s opinion in Robinson.
15
[T]he majority failed to apply the Supreme 
Court’s statutory analysis in Robinson in 
holding, based on the “statutory text,” that 
the term “employee” excludes prospective 
employees like Dellinger. In Robinson, the 
Supreme Court analyzed ... the term “employ­
ees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision ... 
and found “employees” to be ambiguous....
The majority decision departs from such 
analysis by failing to determine that “any 
employee” in the FLSA’s anti-retaliation 
provision is, at minimum, ambiguous as to 
whether Dellinger may bring a claim against 
her prospective employer.
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, pp. 3-4).
[B]ecause the three criteria for application of 
the Robinson analysis are satisfied here, the 
majority should have applied Robinson and 
determined that “employee” in the FLSA’s 
anti-retaliation provision is, at minimum, am­
biguous as to whether prospective employees 
may bring claims.
{Id,., pp. 12-13). The dissenting opinion below noted 
the same conflict.12
In its now-overturned 1995 decision in Robin­
son, the Fourth Circuit had reasoned that the term
12 “The Robinson Court concluded that the word ‘employee’ 
in title VII was ambiguous.” (App. 14a). “[T]he word ‘employee,’ 
as used in the FLSA, is as necessarily ambiguous there as it is 
in Title VII.” (App. 17a). “We have, in fact, called the two defini­
tions ‘identical.’ ” (App. 16a).
16
“employee” in the anti-retaliation provision of Title 
VII must be limited to individuals in an employment 
relationship with the employer because the substan­
tive provisions of Title VII are themselves directed at 
regulating that employment relationship.
[T]he types of practices that Title VII forbids 
strongly point toward the scope of its anti­
retaliation provision not extending beyond 
the employment relationship. The types of 
practices that Title VII forbids are particu­
larly related to employment....
70 F.3d at 330-31 (emphasis in original). Despite the 
fact that this line of reasoning was necessarily rejected 
by this Court’s decision in Robinson, the same argu­
ment was made yet again by the Fourth Circuit in the 
instant case. “[B]y using the term ‘employee’ ... Con­
gress was referring to the employer-employee rela­
tionship the regulation of which underlies the Act as 
a whole....” (App. 6a-7a). Limitation of “employee” to 
those “in the employment relationship” is required, 
the court below reasoned, because that relationship 
“is the context in which the substantive provisions 
operate.” (App. 8a).
The Fourth Circuit decision in Robinson had 
argued that limiting the term “employee” under Title 
VII to an individual in a current employment relation­
ship with the employer was compelled by the Title 
VII definition of “employee.” 70 F.3d at 330. Despite 
this Court’s decision to the contrary in Robinson, the 
Fourth Circuit in the instant case again insisted that 
the FLSA definition of “employee” -  which is identical
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to the Title VII definition -  compels such a limitation. 
(App. 6a).
The Fourth Circuit in the instant case dismissed 
this Court’s decision in Robinson in a footnote, com­
menting merely that “[b jecau se  Robinson deals only 
with former employees, it does not speak to the issue 
in this case.” (App. 10a n.2). But the reasoning of the 
Fourth Circuit decision in the instant case -  reiter­
ating much of the reasoning in the Fourth Circuit’s 
long ago overturned decision in Robinson — is entirely 
inconsistent with this Court’s analysis in Robinson of 
the meaning of “employee.” The Fourth Circuit in the 
instant case repeatedly insisted that “employee” 
refers only to individuals “in an employment relation­
ship” with the defendant. Yet sixteen years ago, the 
Fourth Circuit itself correctly recognized in its en banc 
decision in Robinson that limiting employees to those 
“in an employment relationship” with a defendant 
would necessarily exclude former employees; that was 
the very basis of the Fourth Circuit’s mistaken con­
clusion that “employee” did not include a former 
employee. A former employee like Mr. Robinson is no 
more “in an employment relationship” with his or her 
former employer than an ex-husband is in a marital 
relationship with his ex-wife. There is simply no way 
to reconcile the reasoning in the Fourth Circuit 
decision in the instant case with this Court’s decision 
in Robinson.
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B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S NARROW IN­
TERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 15(a)(3) 
AND 16(b) OF THE FLSA IS INCON­
SISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S RE­
PEATED CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
TERM “ANY”
The FLSA delineates in particularly sweeping lan­
guage the individuals who are protected from retalia­
tion by section 15(a)(3) and who can obtain judicial 
relief under section 16(b). In four separate passages 
identifying those protected by, and authorized to sue 
to enforce, the FLSA anti-retaliation provision, the 
FLSA deliberately uses the all-encompassing word 
“any.” The Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of 
sections 15(a)(3) and 16(b) conflicts with a series of 
emphatic decisions by this Court regarding the mean­
ing and significance of the adjective “any.”
Section 15(a)(3) forbids retaliation by “any person” 
(not merely retaliation by the employer of the person 
retaliated against) and protects from retaliation “any 
employee” (not only an employee of the retaliating 
entity). The defendant in this case is certainly a “per­
son.” The court below acknowledged that Dellinger 
was an employee within the meaning of the FLSA, in 
the sense that she was a former employee of her prior 
employer. (App. 10a n.2). The Fourth Circuit, however, 
held that the phrase “any person” in section 15(a)(3) -  
delineating the entities from whose retaliatory acts 
workers are protected -  should be narrowly inter­
preted to mean “their employer.” (App. 6a) (emphasis 
added). In the Fourth Circuit’s view “any employee”
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in section 15(a)(3) would thus have to mean “an 
employee of the retaliating employer.”
Similarly, section 16(b) authorizes “any one or 
more employees” (not merely one or more employees 
of the defendant) to maintain an action, and provides 
for suit against “any employer” (not merely against 
the employer of the plaintiff). The court of appeals, 
however, held that phrase “any employee” in section 
16(b) means an employee of the defendant, and that 
the phrase “any employer” in section 16(b) should be 
interpreted to mean only an employer of the plaintiff. 
“[T]he text of the applicable remedy allows for private 
civil actions only by employees against their employ­
ers.” (App. 12a) (emphasis added). “[T]here is ... no 
remedy for an employee to sue anyone but his em­
ployer.” (App. 9a) (emphasis added). “[Under] § 216(b) 
... Dellinger could only sue Science Applications if she 
could show that Science Applications was her employ­
er.” (App. 7a-8a) (emphasis added). “§ 216(b) provides 
that... employees may sue only their employer.” (App. 
7a) (emphasis added and omitted). “[T]he FLSA gives 
an employee the right to sue only his or her current 
or former employer.” (App. 2a) (emphasis added). 
“[UJnder § 216(b) ... employees can sue their current 
or former employers.” (App. 6a) (emphasis added).
As the government has correctly pointed out, 
“[t]he majority ... read the word ‘any’ out of sections 
15(a)(3) and 16(b) and thus failed to give proper con­
sideration to its expansive meaning, as recognized 
by the Supreme Court in other contexts.” (Depart­
ment of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 3). In five emphatic
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decisions, this Court has held that the adjective “any” 
signifies that the noun which it modifies is to be given 
the most expansive meaning. Kasten u. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corporation, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 
1332 (2011) (“the phrase ‘any complaint’ suggests a 
broad interpretation”) (emphasis in original); Repub­
lic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848,__ , 129 S.Ct. 2183,
2189 (2009) (“the word ‘any’ ... has an ‘expansive 
meaning” ’); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 
(1997) (“[rjead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an ex­
pansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately 
of whatever kind”) (quoting Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 97 (1996)); Harrison v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (noting that 
“any” is “expansive language”); Shea v. Vialpando, 
416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974) (“the normal meaning of 
‘any’ [allows of] no limitation”).
The Fourth Circuit decision conflicts with this 
entire line of this Court’s decisions. As the govern­
ment has correctly explained,
The Supreme Court has repeatedly inter­
preted “any” expansively, consistent with 
th[e] plain meaning, including in the context 
of FLSA retaliation claims. In Kasten v. 
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. 131 
S.Ct. 1325, 1332 (2011), the Supreme Court 
noted that the use of “any” in the phrase 
“filed any complaint” in section 15(a)(3) 
“suggests a broad interpretation that would 
include an oral complaint.” More generally, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that 
“any” has an “expansive meaning” that does 
not limit the word it modifies.... [“]Read
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naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive 
meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscrimi­
nately of whatever kind.[”].... U.S. v. Gon­
zalez, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1977).
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 7).
The repeated use of the adjective “any” in sections 
15(a)(3) and 16(b) is particularly significant because 
in other provisions of the FLSA Congress deliberately 
used narrower, more limited language. The Fourth 
Circuit held that the phrase “any employee” in sec­
tions 15(a)(3) and 16(b) must mean (referring to a 
current or, perhaps, former employer) “his employee” 
or “its employee.” But when Congress, in drafting the 
FLSA, wanted to restrict in this manner the meaning 
of “employee,” it did so expressly. Seven different 
provisions of the FLSA use the narrow phrase “his 
employee,”13 and two provisions use the phrase “its 
employee.”14 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit insisted 
that the phrase “any employer” in sections 16(b) 
means “his,” “her,” or “their employer.” But when Con­
gress wanted to impose such a limitation it did so 
expressly. In six other provisions of the FLSA Con­
gress did limit in that just way the term “employer.”15
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m), 206(a), 206(b), 206(e)(1), 206(e)(2), 
207(a)(1), 207(a)(2).
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s)(2), 207(p)(l)(A).
15 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m) (“the employee’s employer”), 207(n)(l) 
(“his employer”), 207(o)(5) (“the employee’s employer”), 213(a)(6) 
(“his employer’s immediate family”), 213(a)(6)(B) (“his employer”), 
213(b)(28) (same).
22
C. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S LIMITATION 
ON THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 
15(a)(3) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN 
ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL CO. AND 
MITCHELL V. DEMARIO JEWELRY
The Fourth Circuit opinion rests in part on a 
uniquely narrow characterization of the purpose of 
section 15(a)(3).
[T]he anti-retaliation provision was meant to 
ensure that employees could sue to obtain 
minimum wages and maximum hours from 
their employers without the employers taking 
adverse action against them for the exercise 
of those rights. This purpose is inherent in 
the employment relationship, which is the 
context in which the substantive provisions 
operate.
(App. 9a-10a) (emphasis added). On this view the 
sole, limited purpose of section 15(a)(3) is to prevent 
retaliation by the particular entity with whom the 
victim has an employment relationship. The Fourth 
Circuit insisted that section 15(a)(3) was never in­
tended to interfere with retaliation by anyone else, 
or to provide “protection against any societal retalia­
tion.” (App. 9a). The goal of section 215(a)(3), accord­
ing to the court of appeals, was not to end retaliation 
against workers who complain to the Department of 
Labor or file lawsuits under the FLSA, but only to 
regulate which employers are permitted to engage in 
such reprisals.
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That narrow interpretation of the purpose of sec­
tion 15(a)(3) is inconsistent with this Court’s repeated 
description of the goal of that anti-retaliation provi­
sion. The intent behind section 15(a)(3), this Court 
has held, is to prevent interference with the enforce­
ment process.
Congress ... chose to rely on information and 
complaints received from employees seeking 
to vindicate rights claimed to have been 
denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could 
thus only be expected if employees felt free to 
approach officials with their grievances. This 
end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3) against dis­
charges and other discriminatory practices 
was designed to serve. For it needs no argu­
ment to show that fear of economic retalia­
tion might often operate to induce aggrieved 
employees quietly to accept substandard con­
ditions.
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 
288, 292 (1960). It is the “economic retaliation” that 
impedes enforcement of the FLSA, not merely retalia­
tion from some particular source, which Mitchell 
explains section 15(a)(3) was enacted to prevent.
Referring to anti-retaliation laws generally, this 
Court reiterated in Robinson that “a primary purpose 
of anti-retaliation provisions [is] [maintaining unfet­
tered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” 
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345. The danger that “fear of 
economic retaliation” will “[]fetter[] access to statu­
tory remedial mechanisms” depends on the gravity of
24
the possible retaliation, not on the identity of the 
retaliator. Robinson recognized that it “would under­
mine the effectiveness of Title VII ... [to] allow[] the 
threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims 
of discrimination from complaining” Robinson, 519 
U.S. at 345. The postemployment retaliation held 
unlawful in Robinson was the refusal of a former 
employer to provide a job reference, a refusal that 
might have made it more difficult for the former 
employee to get a particular job. The postemployment 
retaliation held lawful by the Fourth Circuit in the 
instant case -  the outright refusal of an employer to 
hire applicants who had engaged in protected activity 
-  would assuredly be an even greater deterrent.
The type of retaliation alleged in this case falls 
squarely within the statutory purpose delineated by 
Mitchell and Robinson. Workers would hesitate to 
complain about a violation of the FLSA if doing so 
would likely prevent them from obtaining another job. 
Workers are well aware of the danger, recognized by the 
Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits, that they be subject to 
retaliation by a prospective employer who “finds out 
that the employee has in the past cooperated with the 
Secretary [of Labor],”16 as well as the risk, acknowl­
edged by the Fourth Circuit itself, of retaliation by 
prospective employers “who learn they have challenged
16 Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 
1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 1977); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 
F.2d 139, 146 (6th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspec­
tors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the labor practices of previous employers.” Darveau v. 
Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 2008). In 
conflict with the purpose of section 15(a)(3) set out in 
Mitchell and Robinson, the panel opinion “permit[s] 
future employers effectively to discriminate against 
prospective employees for their having exercised their 
rights under the FLSA in the past.” (App. 11a).
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT 
“EMPLOYEE” IN THE FLSA REFERS 
ONLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS “IN 
AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP” WITH 
THE RETALIATORY FLSA EMPLOYER 
CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THE 
THIRD, SIXTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS
The linchpin of the Fourth Circuit’s decision is 
that the term “employee” in sections 15(a)(3) and 16(b) 
refers only to an individual who is in (or, perhaps, 
was once in) an employment relationship with the 
retaliator or defendant, and that the terms “person” 
in section 15(a)(3) and “employer” in section 16(b) 
refer only to the particular employer with whom the 
plaintiff employee has that relationship.
The Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have all 
rejected that limitation on the meanings of “employ­
ee,” “employer,” and “person” in the FLSA. The court 
of appeals’ opinion squarely conflicts with the Third 
Circuit decision in Bowe v. Burns, 137 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 
1943). The plaintiffs in Bowe alleged that, in retalia­
tion for filing a lawsuit under the FLSA, their union 
had expelled them and prevented them from securing
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other employment. The District Court in Bowe dis­
missed the action, holding that retaliation by a union 
was not forbidden by section 15(a) because “the word 
‘person’ as used in Section 215 refers to ‘employer’ 
violators.” Bowe v. Burns, 46 F.Supp. 745, 749 (E.D.Pa. 
1942). The union was not and never had been the 
employer of the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit reversed, 
emphasizing that the terms of section 15(a)(3) forbid 
retaliation by “any person,” not merely by the em­
ployer of the plaintiff, and thus protected from re­
taliation those who were not and never had been 
employees of the retaliator.
Those portions of the A ct... relating to wages 
and to hours do apply only to employers. The 
prohibitions in Section 15 ... , however, are 
applicable “to any person.” ... Section 15(a) 
makes it unlawful ... for “any person,” 
whether or not he is an employer, to discrim­
inate against any employee.... The congres­
sional intent is very plain and the pattern of 
the statute is perfect.
137 F.2d at 38-39. The Third Circuit permitted the 
plaintiff to maintain a civil action against the union 
under section 16(b) even though the union was not 
Bowe’s employer.
The panel opinion conflicts as well with the Sixth 
Circuit decision in United States v. Meek, 136 F.2d 
679 (6th Cir. 1943). Meek had been convicted for hav­
ing caused the unlawful discharge of an individual 
named Crutcher. Meek attacked the conviction “on the 
ground that he could not be guilty ... because he was
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not [Crutcher’s] employer.” 136 F.2d at 679. The United 
States argued in Meek that the prohibitions of section 
15(a)(3) are not limited to employers of the victim.17 
The Sixth Circuit held that it was legally irrelevant 
whether Meek was in any sense Crutcher’s employer 
(or whether Crutcher was Meek’s employee).
It is immaterial whether Meek, at the time, 
was Crutcher’s employer, ... since the prohi­
bitions of the statute are directed to “any 
person.” ... Bowe ... v. ... Burns. As there 
pointed out, the differentiation between the 
prohibitions in other sections of the Act 
directed to the “employer,” and those here 
[in section 15(a)] directed to “any person,” is 
significant of the intent of the Congress.
136 F.2d at 679-80.
Similarly, in Sapperstein v. Hagen, 188 F.3d 852 
(7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit held that the 
protections of section 15(a)(3) are not limited to em­
ployees who work for firms or individuals subject to 
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of sec­
tions 206 and 207.
17 Brief for Appellee, Meek v. United States, Crim. No. 9389 
(6th Cir.) 15-16 (“The Section is expressly applicable to ‘any 
person’ It is not limited to an employer or to a person ... being an 
employer; it prohibits discharge or other discrimination against 
‘any employee’ without any such limitations.... Applying a literal 
construction, the conclusion thus appears to be plain that the 
Section applies to all employees and all persons....”) (Emphasis 
in original).
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[T]he statutory language is quite clear and 
very broad. Congress made it illegal for any 
person, not just an “employer” as defined 
under the statute, to retaliate against any 
employee for reporting ... violations of the 
federal minimum wage or maximum hour 
laws....
188 F.3d at 857. Sapperstein rejects the interpreta­
tion of section 15(a)(3) adopted by the Fourth Circuit 
in the instant case. The Fourth Circuit’s insistence 
that section 15(a)(3) protects only an individual who 
is “in an employment relationship” with the retaliator 
necessarily means that the retaliator must indeed be 
an employer, the employer of the victim.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT HAS DECIDED 
TWO CRITICAL QUESTIONS OF FEDER­
AL LAW WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED 
BY THIS COURT
The Fourth Circuit held, at the urging of the de­
fendant employer, that the FLSA permits an employ­
er to openly refuse to hire any job applicant who has 
previously filed an action under the FLSA or cooper­
ated with the Department of Labor’s efforts to enforce 
the statute. (See pp. 5-6, supra). The court below also 
ruled that the private cause of action provided by the 
FLSA does not permit suits by job applicants. The 
government, in its brief regarding rehearing, cor­
rectly characterized the Fourth Circuit’s decision as 
creating an “untenable gap in coverage.” (Department 
of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4). Because of the serious
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implications of the decision below for the enforcement 
of the FLSA, this is an issue that should be settled by 
this Court.18
Refusing to hire applicants because of their past 
involvement in the enforcement of the FLSA would be 
a particularly effective method of punishing protected 
activity.
It is difficult to imagine a more severe form 
of retaliation than the refusal to hire a job 
applicant because the applicant once exer­
cised her FLSA rights.... If the majority deci­
sion stands ... , an individual not currently 
employed who is seeking a job could poten­
tially remain unemployed indefinitely solely 
because she engaged in FLSA protected ac­
tivity.
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 15).
Fear of this form of retaliation would be especially 
likely to deter workers from asserting their rights 
under the FLSA. “Individuals would be reluctant to 
engage in any protected activity under section 15(a)(3) 
for fear of being blacklisted by future employers.” 
(Department of Labor Merits Brief, p. 2). “Far fewer 
employees would assert their FLSA rights if they
18 The respondent correctly observed in the court of appeals 
that “[t]his case squarely presents for decision the question 
whether a[n] ... applicant for a position is entitled to the protec­
tion of the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act....” Brief of Appellee, p. 2.
30
could be excluded from future employment as a re­
sult. Such a chilling effect would undermine FLSA 
enforcement....” (Department of Labor Rehearing 
Brief, p. 15).
Employees will be deterred from invoking 
their FLSA rights and cooperating in FLSA 
actions for fear of being retaliated against by 
all future employers when seeking employ­
ment.... Forcing an employee to choose 
between asserting her FLSA rights and pos­
sibly rendering herself ineligible for em­
ployment with all future employers or 
accepting FLSA violations without asserting 
her rights would severely constrain FLSA 
enforcement....
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4).19
If, as the Fourth Circuit held, this type of retalia­
tion is lawful under the FLSA, an employer could 
openly adopt such a retaliatory policy, expressly 
notifying job applicants that it does not hire FLSA 
complainants.
19 “Far fewer individuals would exercise their rights under 
section 15(a)(3) if they could be lawfully excluded from all future 
employment as a result.” (Department of Labor Merits Brief, 
p. 20) (footnote omitted). “[I]f an employee can potentially be 
denied employment by all future employers because she engages 
in FLSA protected activity, far fewer employees would exercise 
their FLSA rights and FLSA enforcement would be severely 
undermined” (Secretary of Labor’s Motion for Leave to File 
Amicus Brief, pp. 2-3).
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Employers could ask all job applicants, or 
find out on their own, whether those appli­
cants exercised their FLSA rights and then 
reject every applicant who did so, thereby 
creating a permanent class of “blacklisted” 
individuals who exercised their FLSA rights.
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 15). Job 
seekers could be required as part of the application 
process to provide written assurances that they had 
never filed, joined or testified in an action under the 
FLSA, and had never complained to or cooperated 
with the Department of Labor. Employers could cau­
tion their own employees that the assertion of rights 
under the FLSA, although protected from reprisals by 
that current employer, could be fatal to future job 
prospects.
The type of reprisal held lawful by the Fourth 
Circuit in the instant case poses a substantially 
greater threat to enforcement of the underlying stat­
ute than did the retaliatory practices at issue in 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LLP, 131 
S.Ct. 863 (2011), and Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov­
ernment of Nashville and Davidson County, 555 U.S. 
271 (2009). In Thompson the employer had allegedly 
dismissed one worker to retaliate against another em­
ployee, the fiancee of the dismissed worker. This Court 
noted the likelihood that reprisals against family 
members could deter protected activity. 131 S.Ct. at 
868. But this type of reprisal is not widespread; 
it can be utilized, and could deter protected activity, 
only where the worker who engaged in the protected
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activity happens to be related to (or have a particu­
larly close relationship with) another employee of the 
same employer. In Crawford the employer had retali­
ated against a worker when, in response to questions 
by a personnel official, she complained that she had 
been sexually harassed. But this type of protected 
activity is not common; most complaints regarding 
sexual harassment are made at the initiative of the 
victim, not in response to questions.
In the instant case, on the other hand, the form 
of reprisal sanctioned by the Fourth Circuit could be 
used to punish and deter all forms of protected activi­
ty, not merely the particular form of protected activity 
at issue in Crawford. Moreover, almost all employees 
over the course of their careers work for a number 
of different employers, and thus can expect (except 
toward the end of their careers) to at some point be 
looking for a new job. The typical American worker 
has changed jobs an average of ten times by the age 
of 44.20 Thus virtually all workers could be injured, 
and deterred, by the type of reprisal declared lawful 
by the Fourth Circuit, not merely (as in Thompson) 
employees who work at the same office or plant as 
a family member or workers who (as in Crawford) 
are questioned by their employers about statutory 
violations.
20 See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf and http:// 
www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaqs.htm#anch41, visited October 31, 2011.
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There are sound economic reasons why an em­
ployer, if permitted, might want to avoid hiring 
workers who had previously filed FLSA actions or 
complained to the Department of Labor. Violations of 
the wage and hour and overtime provisions of the 
FLSA, unlike violations of many other federal employ­
ment laws (such as Title VII), are ordinarily profita­
ble. Every dollar not paid to a worker is an additional 
dollar retained by the employer, and thus usually an 
additional dollar of net income to that employer. Even 
employers who believe in good faith that they are 
complying with the FLSA understand that some 
aspect of their personnel practices might be subject to 
challenge under the Act. In either circumstance, it 
makes economic sense for an employer to avoid hiring 
workers whose prior conduct (such as filing a lawsuit 
under the FLSA) indicates that they understand the 
legal rights created by the FLSA and might take 
action if those rights were violated. Thus the govern­
ment has correctly warned that, in light of the Fourth 
Circuit decision, “employers ... are more likely to re­
fuse to hire those who have asserted their FLSA 
rights.” (Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4).
Under the Fourth Circuit rule a worker, once 
hired, could not later be retaliated against if the 
employer subsequently learned about pre-hiring pro­
tected activity. An employer thus has a considerable 
incentive to find out prior to hiring a worker if he or 
she had, for example, previously filed an FLSA action. 
Obtaining that type of information will often be 
quite easy. Although in the instant case the employer
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openly asked the job applicant about her prior in­
volvement in litigation, an employer could often 
readily obtain such information on its own, without 
the job applicant knowing that the employer had that 
information or ever seeing -  as in the instant case -  a 
connection between the information and the denial of 
employment. Simply by using PACER, for example, 
an employer could ascertain in about one minute 
whether a job applicant had ever filed an FLSA action 
in federal court.21
The Fourth Circuit held, not only that this form 
of retaliation is lawful under section 15(a)(3), but also 
that a prospective employee can never maintain an 
action under section 16(b) to enforce the FLSA. That 
procedural holding alone would effectively legalize 
retaliation against prospective employees.
[T]he Secretary [of Labor]’s practical ability 
to remedy retaliation by such employers 
is limited. The Secretary relies heavily on 
private actions under the FLSA (as does the 
EEOC under the Equal Pay Act), and the 
Secretary’s own enforcement actions com­
prise a small percentage of FLSA lawsuits.
21 Upon accessing the PACER website, an employer need 
only (a) click on “find a case,” (b) click on “search the PACER 
case locator,” (c) under “region” pick “all courts,” (d) under 
“party” type the name of the job applicant, and then (e) click on 
“search.”
Information about individuals who have filed federal com­
plaints can be obtained from other sources, such as Westlaw, 
Lexis, and www.justia.com.
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The FLSA’s ... private remedies are thus
critical....
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 14). Civil 
actions filed by the Department of Labor are only 2% 
of all FLSA actions.22 Thus “[bjarring employees from 
bringing FLSA retaliation claims against prospective 
employers would severely undermine FLSA enforce­
ment.” (Id., p. 13) (capitalization omitted).
The threat to enforcement of the FLSA created by 
the Fourth Circuit decision is sufficiently serious that 
it should be addressed by this Court without awaiting 
further developments in the lower courts. In the 
Fourth Circuit today an attorney would have to warn 
any client considering filing suit under the FLSA, or 
complaining to the Department of Labor, that he or 
she could legally be blacklisted by all other employers 
for doing so. Lawyers throughout the nation will have 
to admonish workers, at the least, that this form of 
reprisal may indeed be lawful. Any worker of ordi­
nary prudence would hesitate to engage in protected 
activity if aware that future employers could legally 
ask about and reject applicants based on such activ­
ity. The chilling effect of the decision below, and the 
perverse incentives it creates for preemptive retalia­
tory conduct by employers, should not be permitted to 
continue unabated for years while other lower courts
22 In 2010, there were 6,864 FLSA actions filed in federal 
district courts. The Department of Labor filed 126 of those 
actions. See http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTables 
ForTheFederalJudiciary/December2010.aspx (Table C-2).
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explore the issue. The Solicitor General’s observation 
about the similar problem created by the Sixth Cir­
cuit decision in Crawford is applicable here.
[T]he question whether an employee in peti­
tioner’s circumstance is covered [by the anti­
retaliation provision] ... is of core importance 
to the effective enforcement of [the Act] and 
of recurring significance. The decision below 
creates an inexplicable gap in [the] anti­
retaliation provision.... If the decision below 
is correct, there is every reason to believe 
that Congress would want to act promptly to 
correct the anomaly. Accordingly, there is 
little reason to leave employees in the ... 
Circuit unprotected while awaiting [decisions 
in other circuits].23
Because the controlling legal principles have already 
been repeatedly addressed by decisions of this Court, 
little purpose would be served by delaying considera­
tion of this vital question.
--------------♦--------------
23 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, No. 06- 
1595, p. 18, available at 2007 WL 4439456.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reason, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In the alternative, 
the Solicitor General should be invited to file a brief 
expressing the views of the United States.
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Before NIEMEYER, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit 
Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote 
the opinion, in which Judge Keenan joined. Judge 
King wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Natalie Dellinger commenced this action under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) 
against Science Applications International Corpora­
tion which, she alleges, retaliated against her, in 
violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, 29 
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by refusing to hire her after learn­
ing that she had sued her former employer under the 
FLSA.
The district court granted Science Applications’ 
motion to dismiss, concluding that Dellinger was not 
an “employee” of Science Applications, as defined in 
the FLSA, and that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provi­
sion does not cover prospective employees.
On appeal, Dellinger contends that the FLSA’s 
anti-retaliation provision protects any employee that 
has been the victim of FLSA retaliation by “any per­
son,” including future employers.
Based on the statutory text, we conclude that 
the FLSA gives an employee the right to sue only 
his or her current or former employer and that a
3a
prospective employee cannot sue a prospective em­
ployer for retaliation. We therefore affirm.
I.
According to Dellinger’s complaint, Dellinger 
sued her former employer, CACI, Inc., in July 2009 
for alleged violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage 
and overtime provisions. Around the same time, she 
applied for a job with Science Applications Inter­
national Corporation. In late August 2009, Science 
Applications offered Dellinger a job, contingent on her 
passing a drug test, completing specified forms, and 
verifying and transferring her security clearance. 
Dellinger accepted the offer and began the process of 
satisfying the contingencies.
On the form required for her security clearance, 
Dellinger was required to list any pending noncrimi­
nal court actions to which she was a party, and she 
listed her FLSA lawsuit against CACI, Inc. Several 
days after Dellinger submitted her completed form to 
Science Applications, Science Applications withdrew 
its offer of employment.
Dellinger commenced this action against Science 
Applications, alleging that Science Applications’ mo­
tive for withdrawing its offer was “retaliation and 
unlawful discrimination based on Ms. Dellinger’s ex­
ercise of her protected right to file an FLSA lawsuit,” 
in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Science Applica­
tions filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending
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that Dellinger’s complaint did not state a claim for 
which relief could be granted under the FLSA be­
cause the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects 
only employees, not prospective employees. The dis­
trict court agreed with Science Applications and 
granted its motion, dismissing Dellinger’s complaint.
This appeal followed.
II
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 regulates 
the relationship between employers and their em­
ployees to “correct and as rapidly practicable to 
eliminate” “the existence, in industries engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 
of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of 
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, 
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 
U.S.C. § 202. To this end, the Act establishes a mini­
mum wage that “[e]very employer shall pay to each of 
his employees,” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), and maximum 
hours, providing that “no employer shall employ any 
of his employees . . .  for a workweek longer than forty 
hours” unless the employee receives overtime pay at 
one and one-half times the regular rate, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 207(a). These duties are imposed on employers and 
the beneficiaries are the employers’ employees. In 
addition, the FLSA protects these substantive rights 
by prohibiting retaliation, which it defines in relevant 
part as discrimination “against any employee because 
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
5a
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or 
related to this chapter.” Id. § 215(a)(3).
The Act is enforced through criminal prosecu­
tions, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a); private civil actions by em­
ployees, id. § 216(b); and civil enforcement actions by 
the Secretary of Labor, id. §§ 216(c), 217. See also 
Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 186 n .ll (5th Cir. 
1983) (describing causes of action under the FLSA), 
overruled on other grounds by McLaughlin v. Rich­
land Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988). To protect their 
right to a minimum wage and maximum hours, em­
ployees are authorized to sue not only for violations of 
the Act’s wage and hours provisions, but also for 
retaliation. The authorization for employee enforce­
ment, which is included in § 216(b), provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of 
section 206 [providing for minimum wages] 
or section 207 [providing for maximum 
hours] of this title shall be liable to the em­
ployee or employees affected in the amount 
of their unpaid minimum wages, or their 
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case 
may be, and in an additional equal amount 
as liquidated damages. Any employer who vi­
olates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) 
[prohibiting retaliation] of this title shall be 
liable for such legal or equitable relief as 
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes 
of section 215(a)(3) [prohibiting retaliation] 
of this title, including without limitation em­
ployment, reinstatement, promotion, and the 
payment of wages lost and an additional
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equal amount as liquidated damages. An ac­
tion to recover the liability prescribed in ei­
ther of the preceding sentences may be 
maintained against any employer . . .  in any 
Federal or State court of competent jurisdic­
tion by any one or more employees for and in 
behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated.
Id. § 216(b) (emphasis added).
In this case, Dellinger has not sued her employer, 
but rather a prospective employer, for retaliation. She 
alleges that Science Applications, her prospective em­
ployer, retaliated against her because she had sued a 
former employer under the FLSA. This presents the 
question of whether an applicant for employment 
is an “employee” authorized to sue and obtain relief 
for retaliation under § 216(b). Consistent with the 
FLSA’s purpose to regulate the employer-employee 
relationship and the relevant text of the Act, we con­
clude that only employees can sue their current or 
former employers for retaliation under the FLSA and 
that an applicant is not an employee.
Section 215(a)(3) prohibits retaliation “against 
any employee” because the employee sued the em­
ployer to enforce the Act’s substantive rights. An “em­
ployee” does not, in the Act, exist in a vacuum; rather 
it is defined in relationship to an employer. Section 
203(e)(1) provides that an employee is “any individual 
employed by an employer.” Thus, by using the term 
“employee” in the anti-retaliation provision, Congress 
was referring to the employer-employee relationship,
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the regulation of which underlies the Act as a whole, 
and was therefore providing protection to those in an 
employment relationship with their employer.
Consistent with this context in which § 215(a)(3) 
protects only employees, § 216(b) provides that such 
employees may sue only their employer for retaliation 
(as well as for violations of the Act’s substantive wage 
and hour protections). Section 216(b) begins with a 
sentence stating that any employer who violates 
§ 206 (the minimum wage protection) and § 207 
(the maximum hours protection) is liable to the “em­
ployees affected” by the violations. Section 216(b) 
then continues with a sentence stating that any “em­
ployer” who violates § 215(a)(3) (the anti-retaliation 
provision) is also liable for legal and equitable rem­
edies.1 Those two sentences are followed by the 
provision authorizing employees to file suit under the 
Act: “An action to recover the liability prescribed in 
either of the preceding sentences may be maintained 
against any employer . . .  in any Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more 
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves 
and other employees similarly situated.” Because an 
employee is given remedies for violations of § 215(a)(3)
1 The dissent notes that § 216(b) includes remedies of both 
“employment” and “reinstatement” and reasons that the inclu­
sion of “employment” as a remedy necessarily means that the 
FLSA protects prospective employees. But this logic is not com­
pelling because “employment” is not limited to prospective em­
ployees. That remedy can also be afforded to a former employee 
hired back to a different position, and its inclusion, therefore, 
simply reflects Congress’ desire to cover all possibilities.
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only from an employer, Dellinger could only sue 
Science Applications if she could show that she was 
an employee and that Science Applications was her 
employer.
Yet Dellinger cannot make that showing. Al­
though she was an applicant for employment with 
Science Applications and her application had been 
approved on a contingent basis, she never began 
work. Section 203(g) provides that “employ” means 
“suffer or permit to work.” Therefore an applicant 
who never began or performed any work could not, by 
the language of the FLSA, be an “employee.”
Dellinger argues that because § 215(a), defining 
“prohibited acts,” states that “it shall be unlawful for 
any person” to retaliate against any employee, she 
can sue any “person,” rather than simply her em­
ployer. She argues that because Science Applications 
is a “person” prohibited from retaliating, she there­
fore can sue Science Applications.
While § 215(a)(3) does prohibit all “persons” from 
engaging in certain acts, including retaliation against 
employees, it does not authorize employees to sue 
“any person.” An employee may only sue employers 
for retaliation, as explicitly provided in § 216(b). The 
use of the term “person” in § 215(a) is attributable to 
the structure of the provision, which prohibits a num­
ber of separate acts in addition to retaliation, not all 
of which are acts performed by employers. For in­
stance, § 215(a)(1) prohibits any person from trans­
porting “any goods in the production of which any
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employee was employed in violation of section 206 
[minimum wages] or section 207 [maximum hours] of 
this title.” Thus, Congress prohibited the shipment of 
goods produced by employees who are paid in viola­
tion of the Act, and for enforcement, it authorized the 
criminal prosecution of any “person” violating the 
prohibition. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). Just as there is no 
remedy for an employee to sue such a shipper, there 
is also no remedy for an employee to sue anyone but 
his employer for violations of the anti-retaliation pro­
vision. Accordingly, if the person retaliating against 
an employee is not an employer, the person is not 
subject to a private civil action by an employee under 
§ 216(b).
Considering the Act more broadly, we cannot over­
look the fact that the FLSA was intended at its core 
to provide minimum wages and maximum hours of 
work to ensure employees a minimum standard of 
living necessary for “health, efficiency, and general 
well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). The anti­
retaliation provision is included, not as a free­
standing protection against any societal retaliation, 
but rather as an effort “to foster a climate in which 
compliance with the substantive provisions of the 
[FLSA] would be enhanced.” Mitchell v. Robert 
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 293 (1960). 
Thus, the anti-retaliation provision was meant to 
ensure that employees could sue to obtain minimum 
wages and maximum hours from their employers 
without the employers taking adverse action against 
them for the exercise of those rights. This purpose is
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inherent in the employment relationship, which is the 
context in which the substantive provisions operate.
We have been unable to find any case that ex­
tends FLSA protections to applicants or prospective 
employees. Indeed, prior cases have reached the con­
clusion that we have, applying the anti-retaliation 
provision only within the employer-employee rela­
tionship. See, e.g., Glover v. City of North Charleston, 
S.C., 942 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D.S.C. 1996) (noting that 
the “any employee” language in the anti-retaliation 
provision mandates that the plaintiff have an em­
ployment relationship with the defendant); Harper v. 
San Luis Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 848 F. Supp. 911 (D. 
Col. 1994) (same); cf. Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 
F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2008) (requiring, as part of 
a prima facie FLSA retaliation case, a showing of 
“adverse action by the employer”); Dunlop v. Carriage 
Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
an employee could sue his former employer when the 
former employer retaliated against the employee by 
advising a prospective employer that the employee 
had previously filed an FLSA suit).2
2 The dissent, in urging that we rely on Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), to extend the FLSA to applicants 
and prospective employees, overlooks the fact that Robinson 
held that “employee” as defined in Title VII included former 
employees. Indeed, we accept that “employee” under the FLSA 
also affords protection from retaliation to former employees. The 
issue here is whether the FLSA applies to persons who are not 
yet employees and who have never worked for the employer. 
Because Robinson deals only with former employees, it does not 
speak to the issue in this case.
11a
We are sympathetic to Dellinger’s argument that 
it could be problematic to permit future employers 
effectively to discriminate against prospective em­
ployees for having exercised their rights under the 
FLSA in the past. The notion, however, that any 
person who once in the past sued an employer could 
then sue any prospective employer claiming that she 
was denied employment because of her past litigation 
would clearly broaden the scope of the FLSA beyond 
its explicit purpose of fixing minimum wages and 
maximum hours between employees and employers. 
We are, of course, not free to broaden the scope of a 
statute whose scope is defined in plain terms, even 
when “morally unacceptable retaliatory conduct” may 
be involved. Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 
360, 364 (4th Gir. 2000).
Dellinger urges us to extend the FLSA’s defini­
tion of “employee” to protect job applicants, pointing 
to other statutes under which applicants are pro­
tected. In particular, she refers to the Energy Re­
organization Act, the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”), the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(“OSHA”), and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act. 
Reference to these statutes, however, does not ad­
vance her cause. The case cited by Dellinger with 
respect to the Energy Reorganization Act merely 
assumed, without deciding, that an applicant was 
covered under that Act. See Doyle u. Secretary of 
Labor, 285 F.3d 243, 251 n.13 (3d Cir. 2002). While 
the NLRA does protect prospective employees from 
retaliation, the Act itself defines “employee” more
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broadly than does the FLSA, providing that the term 
“employee” “shall not be limited to the employees of a 
particular employer” unless explicitly stated. See 29 
U.S.C. § 152(3). With respect to OSHA and the Pipe­
line Safety Improvement Act, regulations implement­
ing those statutes have been promulgated to extend 
protections to prospective employees. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1977.5(b) (OSHA); 29 C.F.R. § 1981.101 (Pipeline 
Safety Improvement Act). The Secretary of Labor has 
not, however, promulgated a similar regulation for 
the FLSA.
Because we conclude that the text and purpose of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 link the Act’s 
application closely to the employment relationship 
and because the text of the applicable remedy allows 
for private civil actions only by employees against 
their employers, we hold that the FLSA anti­
retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), does not 
authorize prospective employees to bring retaliation 
claims against prospective employers. The judgment 
of the district court is accordingly
AFFIRMED.
KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
It has been just short of fifteen years since Jus­
tice Thomas delivered the opinion on behalf of a 
unanimous Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), a decision that has 
since stood as the definitive authority on statutory
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construction. Then, as now, a plaintiff having no 
active employment relationship with the defendant 
employer had commenced a lawsuit alleging unlaw­
ful retaliation pursuant to a federal remedial statute 
that, on its face, provides redress solely to “em­
ployees.” Prior to the Court’s reversal of our en banc 
judgment in Robinson, few imagined that a former 
employee could successfully sue under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In like fashion here, Natalie 
Dellinger, a prospective employee of Science Appli­
cations International Corporation, has brought suit 
against the company pursuant to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (the “FLSA” or “Act”). 
Dellinger’s Complaint alleges that Science Applica­
tions agreed to hire her but wrongly refused to follow 
through notwithstanding that she had fulfilled each 
disclosed condition of employment.
It appears, however, that Ms. Dellinger failed to 
meet one additional, undisclosed condition: that she 
not have demonstrated an inclination to hold her 
bosses accountable under the law. Science Applica­
tions terminated the hiring process upon being in­
formed that Dellinger had recently filed suit against 
her previous employer pursuant to the FLSA. Accord­
ing to the Complaint, the allegations and reasonable 
inferences of which we are bound to take as true, 
Science Applications jettisoned Dellinger’s paperwork 
in retaliation for her having exercised her lawful 
rights. The district court nonetheless ruled that 
Dellinger had failed to state a viable FLSA claim 
against Science Applications and dismissed her case.
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The majority affirms with no discussion of Robinson 
or its established methodology, giving its thumbs-up 
to the company’s conduct and paving the way for 
other employers to adopt similar practices. Because I 
cannot escape the conclusion that Robinson mandates 
the opposite result from that reached by the majority 
today, I respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
In Robinson, the Court instructed that the “first 
step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether 
the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous 
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the 
case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory lan­
guage is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is 
coherent and consistent.” 519 U.S. at 340 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine 
whether a statutory provision is ambiguous, a court 
looks “to the language itself, the specific context 
in which that language is used, and the broader con­
text of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 341 (citations 
omitted).
The Robinson Court concluded that the word “em­
ployee” in Title VII was ambiguous because (1) there 
was no temporal qualifier in the statute to indicate 
that it applied either to current or former employees,
i.e., neither the term “current employee” nor the term 
“former employee” appeared anywhere in Title VII;
(2) the statute’s prescribed definition of employee
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also contained no temporal qualifier, meaning that it 
could include either current or former employees; and 
(3) the statute referred to “reinstatement” and “hir­
ing” of employees, both of which indicate an expan­
sion of the definition beyond current employees. See 
519 U.S. at 341-43. The Court continued: “Once it is 
established that the term ‘employees’ includes former 
employees in some sections, but not in others, the 
term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and 
each section must be analyzed to determine whether 
the context gives the term a further meaning that 
would resolve the issue in dispute.” Id. at 343-44 
(emphasis added).
Finding it necessary, in light of Title VH’s ambi­
guity, to embark on a contextual analysis, the Su­
preme Court observed that “several sections of the 
statute plainly contemplate that former employees 
will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title 
VII.” 519 U.S. at 345. The Court endorsed the 
government’s position, as amicus curiae, that a re­
strictive interpretation “would undermine the effec­
tiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of 
postemployment retaliation to deter victims of dis­
crimination from complaining to the EEOC, and 
would provide a perverse incentive for employers 
to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims.” 
Id. at 346. The Court thus ordered reinstatement of 
the plaintiff’s retaliation action, “[i]t being more 
consistent with the broader context of Title VII and 
the primary purpose of [the antiretaliation provi­
sion].” Id.
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Robinson, of course, did not arise under the FLSA, 
but its analytical framework readily admits of a more 
widely reaching application, and it should therefore 
powerfully inform our analysis of Dellinger’s appeal. 
Indeed, we have acknowledged “the almost uniform 
practice of courts in considering the authoritative 
body of Title VII case law when interpreting the com­
parable provisions of other federal statutes.” Darveau 
v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(citations omitted). The FLSA’s designation of an 
“employee” as “any individual employed by an em­
ployer,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), is more than “compa­
rable” to that of Title VII, which defines the same 
term as “an individual employed by an employer,” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(f). We have, in fact, called the two 
definitions “identical.” Darveau, 515 F.3d at 342.
It is hardly surprising, then, that in Darveau we 
determined that the FLSA, just like Title VII as 
applied in Robinson, protects former employees from 
retaliation. In so concluding, we discerned “no signifi­
cant differences in either the language or intent of 
the two statutes regarding the type of adverse action 
their retaliation provisions prohibit.” 515 F.3d at 342. 
Judge Motz explained, somewhat prophetically, that it 
is necessary to afford such protection to former em­
ployees “because they often need references from past 
employers, they may face retaliation from new em­
ployers who learn they have challenged the labor prac­
tices of previous employers, and they sometimes must 
return to past employers for a variety of reasons,
17a
putting them once more at risk of retaliation.” Id. at 
343 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
B.
1.
We could not have ruled as we did in Darveau 
without acknowledging, though tacitly, that the word 
“employee,” as used in the FLSA, is as necessarily 
ambiguous there as it is in Title VII. To that extent, 
at least, Darveau binds the majority, but it nonethe­
less appears to have reached the same conclusion on 
its own that this is not a “plain language” case. Al­
though it purports to rule “[b]ased on the statutory 
text,” ante at 3, the majority also relies on its divina­
tion of the purpose of the Act, together with an as­
sessment of the statutory context, to circumscribe 
who may be considered an employee thereunder. See 
ante at 6-8.
As the majority correctly notes, the FLSA pri­
marily concerns itself with establishing minimum 
wages and maximum hours for current employees. 
That notwithstanding, the Act also prohibits the 
movement in commerce of goods with respect to “the 
production of which any employee was employed” in 
violation of the wage and hour requirements. 29 
U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (emphasis added). The word “em­
ployee” in that sense can refer to former employees, 
as made clear by the subsection following, which 
provides that the government may establish a prima 
facie case of an employer’s violation by showing that
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the overworked or underpaid employee was employed 
“within ninety days prior to the removal of the goods 
from” the employee’s place of employment. § 215(b).
It is, of course, scarcely remarkable that the 
FLSA applies to former employees; that was, after all, 
our plain holding in Darveau. The more salient point 
for our purposes is that the Act’s ascription of more 
than one meaning to the word “employee” establishes, 
for Robinson purposes, that the statutory term is 
“necessarily ambiguous.” I therefore agree with the 
majority that we must examine contextual clues to 
ascertain the breadth of the FLSA’s antiretaliation 
provision.
2.
It is unlawful under the FLSA “for any person,” 
not just employers, “to discharge or in any other 
manner discriminate against any employee because 
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted 
. . . any proceeding under or related to this chapter[.]” 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a), -(a)(3). The Act criminalizes willful 
violations of § 215, and it also provides civil recourse 
to “employees affected” by the retaliatory acts de­
scribed in subsection (a)(3). See § 216(a), -(b). Affected 
employees are entitled to “legal or equitable relief 
as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes o f ’ 
the antiretaliation provision, “including without limi­
tation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and 
the payment of wages lost and an additional equal 
amount as liquidated damages.” § 216(b). Liability
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attaches to “[a]ny employer,” id., which “includes any 
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest 
of an employer in relation to an employee.” § 203(d).
A plain reading of these several sections of the 
Act, taken together, indicates that Congress was con­
cerned enough with retaliatory conduct to impose 
criminal penalties on actual decisionmakers (“any 
person”), regardless of whether that person could also 
be considered the employing entity or was acting at 
the entity’s behest. Civil liability for retaliation, on 
the other hand, is reserved for employers and their 
agents who are sued by an “employee,” which gen­
erally means “any individual employed by an em­
ployer.” § 203(e)(1). Science Applications is undoubtedly 
an employer subject to the Act, and Ms. Dellinger 
broadly qualifies as an employee, having once sued 
her former employer for allegedly violating the FLSA. 
It does not follow perforce, however, that “Dellinger 
could only sue Science Applications if she could show 
. .. that Science Applications was her employer.” Ante 
at 7 (emphasis added).
It would hardly be a stretch to interpret the 
FLSA to permit Ms. Dellinger’s action, particularly 
considering that other, similar remedial statutes al­
ready apply to employees in her situation. For example, 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) defines 
the term “employee” to “include any employee, and 
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Moreover, as the majority 
sets forth, regulations implementing the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) have construed that
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statute to afford court access to prospective em­
ployees. See ante at 10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b)). 
This has occurred notwithstanding that OSHA de­
fines “employee” arguably more narrowly than does 
the FLSA as “an employee of an employer who is 
employed in a business of his employer which affects 
commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (emphasis added).
The majority finds these analogs unpersuasive, 
observing unremarkably that the NLRA’s particular­
ized definition of “employee” more readily lends itself 
to an expansive reading of who may sue. See ante at
10. The majority’s point appears to be that the ab­
sence of similarly detailed language in the FLSA 
demands the conclusion that Congress intended the 
eligibility for bringing a retaliation suit under that 
statute to be more restrictive. But Robinson counsels 
against just that sort of negative inference:
[T]hat other statutes have been more specific 
in their coverage of “employees” and “former 
employees,” see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1994
ed., Supp. I) (defining “employee” to include 
“former employee”); 5 U.S.C. § 1212(a)(1) (in­
cluding “employees, former employees, and 
applicants for employment” in the operative 
provision), proves only that Congress can use 
the unqualified term “employees” to refer 
only to current employees, not that it did 
so in this particular statute.
519 U.S. at 341-42 (emphasis in original). Likewise, 
Congress can certainly use the word “employee” 
in a manner that excludes prospective employees or
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applicants for employment, but that it declined in 
this case to expressly include them is not, under 
Robinson, reliable evidence of legislative intent to the 
contrary.
The majority sloughs off the approach taken in 
administering OSHA, noting simply that “[t]he Sec­
retary of Labor has not . . . promulgated a similar 
regulation for the FLSA.” Ante at 10. True enough, we 
have not been specifically tasked with deciding 
whether the Secretary could reasonably construe the 
Act in the manner that Ms. Dellinger seeks. But 
in dismissing outright her arguments, even in this 
non-deferential context, are we not implicitly passing 
upon the objective reasonableness of the construction 
for which she advocates? I suppose the majority 
would be constrained to rejoin that permitting retali­
ation suits absent some sort of employment privity is 
indeed unreasonable if one accords significance to the 
FLSA having been fashioned in the crucible of that 
privity, a proposition enthusiastically endorsed by the 
majority, ante at 8-10. Following that logic, and 
mindful of OSHA’s similarly discrete mandate that an 
employer “furnish to each of his employees . . .  a place 
of employment .. . free from recognized hazards,” 
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Secretary 
should be grateful that her occupational safety and 
health regulations are not before us today, for they 
would surely wither under the majority’s unforgiving 
gaze.
The majority thus ignores Robinson and resorts 
to its unsanctioned “original intent” methodology,
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presumably because it cannot adequately square the 
result it reaches with the Act’s substantive context, 
that is, the literal words of § 216(b) affording victims 
of retaliation the alternative remedies of “reinstate­
ment” and “employment.” Obviously, only former 
employees can be reinstated, leaving the remedy of 
employment to those who cannot be reinstated, i.e., 
those, like Dellinger, who have yet to be employed. 
See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342 (illustrating intended 
breadth of term “employee” in Title VII through alter­
native remedies of reinstatement and hiring, observ­
ing that “because one does not reinstate current 
employees, that language necessarily refers to former 
employees”) (internal brackets and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Broughman v. Carver, 624 F.3d 670, 
677 (4th Cir. 2010) (reiterating “our duty to give 
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a stat­
ute”) (citation omitted). Informed by the context of 
§ 216(b), Ms. Dellinger’s construction of the word 
“employee” in § 215(a) is, in my opinion, compelled 
by Robinson. At the very least, her construction 
seems eminently reasonable.
I am therefore left to wonder why, in the face of a 
statute’s relative silence as to a material enforcement 
term, we must presume that a particular avenue is 
foreclosed because it is not explicitly mentioned, 
rather than permitted because it is not specifically 
prohibited. See Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. v. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 444 F.3d 1095, 
1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[F]aced with two reasonable 
and conflicting interpretations, [an act] should be
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interpreted to further its remedial purpose.”)- The 
majority’s decision today bucks the trend begun by 
Robinson, which is indisputably toward an expan­
sive interpretation of protective statutes like Title 
VII and the FLSA to thwart employer retaliation. 
See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491
(2008) (concluding that, under applicable provision 
of ADEA, federal employee may state claim for re­
taliation as form of discrimination); CBOCS West, Inc. 
v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (ruling that 
anti-discrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 en­
compass action for retaliation); Jackson v. Birmingham 
Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (same with 
respect to Title IX).
Behind this impressive array of authority is the 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the vital role 
that antiretaliation provisions play in regulating a 
vast range of undesirable behaviors on the part of em­
ployers. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nash­
ville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852
(2009) (observing that fear of retaliation is primary 
motivation behind employees’ failure to voice con­
cerns about bias and discrimination and reversing 
Sixth Circuit’s judgment in employer’s favor as incon­
sistent with primary objective of Title VII to avoid 
harm to employees) (citations omitted); Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) 
(explaining that liability for Title VII retalia­
tion extends well beyond those actions affecting terms 
and conditions of employment to include employer’s 
acts outside workplace that are “materially adverse
24a
to a reasonable employee or job applicant”). There 
is no reason to doubt that similar concerns obtain in 
the FLSA context, as expressed in Reyes-Fuentes v. 
Shannon Produce Farm, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 
(S.D. Ga. 2009) (“Congress chose to rely upon infor­
mation and complaints from employees seeking to 
vindicate their rights. Plainly, effective enforcement 
could thus only be expected if employees felt free to 
approach officials with their grievances”) (citations 
omitted).
In Robinson itself, Justice Thomas took note of 
the plaintiff’s and the government’s arguments that 
the essence and continued vitality of Title VII’s 
enforcement scheme depended on a beneficent view of 
its scope.
These arguments carry persuasive force 
given their coherence and their consistency 
with a primary purpose of antiretaliation 
provisions: Maintaining unfettered access 
to statutory remedial mechanisms. .. . [I]t 
would be destructive of this purpose of the 
antiretaliation provision for an employer to 
be able to retaliate with impunity against an 
entire class of acts.. . . We agree with these 
contentions and find that they support the 
inclusive interpretation of “employees” .. . 
that is already suggested by the broader con­
text of Title VII.
519 U.S. at 346 (citations omitted). Indeed, the con­
duct in which Science Applications is alleged to have 
engaged in this very case is especially troubling,
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vividly demonstrating through Dellinger’s example of 
how easily it can identify “litigious” applicants and 
resolve to exclude the entire class from its payroll. It 
is beyond my comprehension that the majority can 
shrug its shoulders and countenance this sort of be­
havior when the Supreme Court has provided the 
means and encouragement to do something about it.
II.
Finally, the majority overlooks our decision in 
McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989), 
in which we opened the door to a less restrictive 
interpretation of “employee” in the FLSA context. In 
Ensley, we ruled that the employer’s unpaid trainees 
must be considered employees and entitled to mini­
mum wage payments even though the culmination of 
the hiring process was made contingent upon the 
successful completion of the training. Id. at 1210. In 
so concluding, the Ensley majority rejected the dis­
sent’s view that the trainees did not fit within 
§ 203(e)(l)’s definition of “employee.” See 877 F.2d at 
1210 (Wilkins, J., dissenting) (characterizing “the 
true legal issue” as being the classification of the 
trainees as employees under the FTCA).
At Science Applications, Ms. Dellinger found 
herself in the same position as the trainees in Ensley. 
There was no legitimate impediment between her and 
the imminent assumption of her job duties. Cf. Ensley, 
877 F.2d at 1208 (reciting that the trainees could, in 
theory, have demonstrated themselves unqualified,
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but observing that “no person, who had completed the 
training, was not subsequently hired”). Ensley is, of 
course, binding upon subsequent panels, and it 
requires us to recognize the validity of Ms. Dellinger’s 
FLSA retaliation claim, just as we recognized as valid 
the trainees’ claim for wage payments under the Act.
III.
For all the foregoing reasons, I am convinced that 
Ms. Dellinger, an employee within the meaning of the 
FLSA, has pleaded a legally sufficient retaliation 
claim against Science Applications. Inasmuch as the 
majority holds to the contrary, I respectfully dissent.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
NATALIE DELLINGER 
Plaintiff, 
v.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
I:10cv25 (JCC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Filed Apr. 2, 2010)
This case is before the Court on a Motion to 
Dismiss filed by Defendant Science Applications In­
ternational Corporation (“SAIC”). (Dkt. 3.) Plaintiff, 
Natalie Dellinger (“Dellinger” or “Plaintiff”), alleges 
that SAIC violated the anti-retaliation provision of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by refusing to hire her after they 
received notice that she had filed a separate FLSA 
action against a former employer. On February 3, 
2010 Defendant moved to dismiss on the basis 
that Plaintiff was never an “employee” of Defendant. 
Plaintiff opposed on February 22 and Defendant 
replied on February 26, 2010. For the reasons stated 
below, and in accordance with this Court’s decision 
from the bench at the March 5, 2010 motion hearing, 
the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
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I. Background
The relevant factual allegations in the Complaint 
are as follows. Plaintiff has worked as an administra­
tive assistant on various government contracts re­
quiring security clearance, most recently in 2008 and 
part of 2009, when plaintiff was an employee of 
CACI. Inc. (Compl. 11 1-2.) In late July 2009, Plain­
tiff filed a claim against CACI, Inc. for violations of 
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the 
FLSA. (Compl. 11 13-14.) At the same time, Plaintiff 
applied for a job with SAIC at the Sherman Kent 
School of the CIA for, at least in part, administrative 
support requiring an individual with security clear­
ance. (Compl. *n^I 16-18.) After interviewing her for the 
position, SAIC offered Plaintiff the position of Ad­
ministrative Assistant on or about August 21, 2009. 
(Compl. 1 20-22.)
This offer was contingent, however, upon Plain­
tiff’s successful completion of a drug test, her sub­
mission of a “standard 1-9 form,” and, because the 
position plaintiff was offered required a security 
clearance, her offer was also contingent upon the 
successful verification, crossover, and maintenance of 
her security clearance including the completion and 
submission of a government document known as Stan­
dard Form 86 (“SF 86”.) (Compl. H  25-27.) The SF 86 
is used for national security positions, and contains a 
variety of background questions includes, among other 
things, a request for the applicant to list any non­
criminal court actions to which the applicant has been 
or is currently a party. (Compl. 1 28.) As required,
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Ms. Dellinger listed on the SF 86 that she had filed a 
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia alleging FLSA violations against 
her former employer, CACI. (Compl. 1 29.)
Ms. Dellinger hand-delivered her signed em­
ployment offer letter, her SF 86, and other required 
documents to an SAIC employee named Brian Powers 
on August 24, 2009. (Compl. 1 32.) That same day, 
Ms. Dellinger took and passed the drug test required 
for employment with SAIC. (Compl. 133.) SAIC 
withdrew its offer of employment after August 24 
(Compl. 1 34.) Two SAIC employees independently 
confirmed that SAIC had taken no action regarding 
her employment application after August 24, 2010. 
(Compl. 1 35-36.) The Complaint alleges that SAICs 
failure to employ Ms. Dellinger was retaliatory action 
for her filing of her FLSA action against CACI.
II. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal 
sufficiency of a complaint. See Randall v. United 
States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation 
omitted). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis­
miss, the Court is first mindful of the liberal pleading 
standards under Rule 8, which require only “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Thus, 
the Court takes “the material allegations of the 
complaint” as admitted and liberally construes the 
Complaint in favor of Plaintiffs. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citation omitted).
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While Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual 
allegations,” a plaintiff must still provide “more than 
labels and conclusions” because “a formulaic recita­
tion of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964- 
65 (2007) (citation omitted). Courts will also decline 
to consider “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable 
conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 2009 WL 5126224, *3 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (citing Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n. 26 (4th Cir.2009); see also 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009). 
Indeed, the legal framework of the Complaint must 
be supported by factual allegations that “raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 127 
S.Ct. at 1965.
In its recent decision, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct 
1937 (2009), the Supreme Court expanded upon 
Twombly by articulating the two-pronged analytical 
approach to be followed in any Rule 12(b)(6) test. 
First, a court must identify and reject legal conclu­
sions unsupported by factual allegations because they 
are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. at 
1951. “[B]are assertions” that amount to nothing 
more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” do 
not suffice. Id. (citations omitted). Second, assuming 
the veracity of “well-pleaded factual allegations”, a 
court must conduct a “context-specific” analysis 
drawing on “its judicial experience and common 
sense” and determine whether the factual allegations
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“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 
1950-51.
Satisfying this “context-specific” test does not 
require “detailed factual allegations.” Nemet Chevrolet, 
Ltd., 2009 WL 5126224 at *4 (citing Iqbal at 1949-50 
(quotations omitted)). The complaint must, however, 
plead sufficient facts to allow a court, drawing on 
“judicial experience and common sense,” to infer 
“more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges a cause of action under the anti­
retaliation provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a plau­
sible claim for relief as she is not, nor has she ever 
been an “employee” within the meaning of the Act. 
This Court agrees with Defendant and finds that 
Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that 
she was an “employee” of SAIC within the meaning of 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
A. Plain Meaning
“In a statutory construction case, the beginning 
point must be the language of the statute, and when 
a statute speaks with clarity to an issue[,] judicial 
inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most 
extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” Ramey v. 
Director, office of Workers’ Compensation Program, 
326 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Estate of
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Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 
(1992)). The statute at issue here, 29 U.S.C. § 215 
states, in pertinent part:
(a) [I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(3) to discharge or in any other manner dis­
criminate against any employee because such 
employee has filed any complaint or institut­
ed or caused to be instituted any proceeding 
under or related to this chapter .. .
29 U.S.C. § 215 (emphasis added). Congress chose to 
define “employee” as “any individual employed by an 
employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)1. For an individual to 
be “employed” by an “employer” they must be “suf- 
fer[ed] or permitt[ed] to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
Here, Plaintiff was never “permitted” to work for 
SAIC, in fact, her main allegation is that the offer of 
employment was withdrawn. (See Compl. 34.)
The two district courts that have addressed this 
issue have found that a job applicant should not be 
considered an “employee” for purposes of the anti­
retaliation provision of the FLSA. In Harper v. San 
Luis Valley Regional Medical Center, an applicant for 
a nursing position at defendant hospital was involved 
in an unrelated federal wage claim suit against 
several municipalities. Harper, 848 F.Supp. 911 (D. 
Colo. 1994). The hospital hired several allegedly less
1 An “employer includes any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee. . . . ” 29 U.S.C.§ 203(d).
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qualified individuals over plaintiff Harper and Har­
per filed suit alleging FLSA retaliation. In reaching 
its decision the Court specifically relied on the plain 
language of the statute, noting that “where a statute 
names parties who come within its provisions, other 
unnamed parties are excluded.” Id. at 913-914 
(D.Colo. 1994) (citing Foxgord v. Hischemoeller, 820 
F.2d 1030, 1035, cert, denied, 484 U.S. 986, (9th Cir. 
1987); See Contract Courier Services, Inc. v. Research 
and Special Programs Admin, of U.S. Depart, of 
Transp., 924 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding 
“statutory words mean nothing unless they distin­
guish one situation from another; line-drawing is the 
business of language”). The Court in Harper held that 
§ 215(a)(3) “specifically identifies those individuals 
who come within its provisions i.e. employees. There­
fore, other unnamed parties such as non-employee job 
applicants are excluded from its protection.” Harper, 
848 F.Supp. at 914.
In the similar case of Glover v. City of North 
Charleston, plaintiff was also the lead plaintiff in a 
separate FLSA wage and hour suit against the North 
Charleston (Fire Dept.) District. Glover, 42 F. Supp. 
243 (D.S.C. 1996). After Glover brought suit against 
the District, the District Fire Department was dis­
banded and the City of North Charleston Fire De­
partment was formed; however, the City had 
discretion to determine which of the District Depart­
ment’s employees would be hired. Id. at 245. In his 
suit against the City, Glover alleged a violation of 
§ 215(a)(3) claiming the City’s decision not to hire 
Glover was retaliation for his earlier FLSA claims. In
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dismissing the case, the Glover court found that 
plaintiffs were job applicants and thus not yet “em­
ployees” within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 246.
In so doing, the Court drew a careful distinction 
between § 215’s initial language holding that it “shall 
be unlawful for any person” to commit certain acts 
(§ 215(a)), and more limited language of the provision 
at issue here, protecting “any employee” from the 
person’s misconduct (§ 215(a)(3)). Id. at 245-246 
(emphasis added). The court found that the statute’s 
application to “any person” did not bar suit against 
the “non-employer” City, however, the plain language 
of the statue [sic] restricting its protections to “any 
employee” did mean that a mere job “applicant” did 
not have standing to bring a § 215 action. Id. As the 
Glover court found, the first sentence of the statute 
applies to “any person,” if “Congress wanted to cover 
non-employees, it could have written § 215(a)(3) to 
prevent discrimination [or retaliation] against “any 
person” instead of “any employee.” Id. at 246-247. 
Based on the plain language of the statute, the courts 
that have considered the issue have found that 
§ 215(a)(3) does not cover job applicants.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish these cases as 
outliers and non-binding on this Court. As decisions 
from other Districts they are clearly not binding 
precedent, however, their reasoning is, contrary to 
Plaintiff’s argument, applicable here. Both opinions 
rest on the plain language of the statute and both 
were unwilling to read the term “employee” to mean 
an individual who was never employed the Defendant.
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Defendant points to the leading Fourth case 
regarding the sufficiency of an anti-retaliation claim 
under FLSA, Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 
(4th Cir. 2008.) In the Fourth Circuit, to assert a 
prima facie claim of retaliation under the FLSA a 
plaintiff must show: “that (1) he engaged in an activi­
ty protected by the FLSA; (2) he suffered adverse 
action by the employer subsequent to or contempora­
neous with such protected activity; and (3) a causal 
connection exists between the employee’s activity and 
the employer’s adverse action.” Darveau v. Detecon, 
Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Wolf v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 
2000); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 
1394 (10th Cir. 1997)). Similarly, Defendant argues 
that as the Fourth Circuit standard requires a “casu­
al [sic] connection” between the “employee’s activity” 
and the “employer’s” action, Plaintiff has no standing 
to bring suit as she was never an “employee.” (Mem. 
in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) Without reading beyond 
the plain language of the statute, a job applicant 
cannot be considered an “employee.”
B. Alternative Arguments
Plaintiff offers a number of arguments why this 
Court should expand the definition of “employee” to 
include job applicants. While the Court believes that 
the plain language of the statute is clear, it will never­
theless address each of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn.
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First, Plaintiff argues that the FLSA taken as a 
whole indicates that “employee” should include job 
applicants. In support of this argument, Plaintiff 
points to § 216(a) of the statute which makes it 
unlawful for “any person” to violate the terms of § 215 
and provides that the remedies of both “employment” 
and “reinstatement” are available to aggrieved em­
ployees. 29 U.S.C. § 216. As the Court in Glover found 
and Defendant argues here had Congress wanted to 
include non-employees such as job applicants, it could 
have used the “any person” language from § 216 
rather than the “any employee” language it chose. 
Glover, 942 F. Supp. at 246-247
Second, Plaintiff argues that this Court should 
look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for guidance 
regarding the ambiguity of the definition “employee.” 
(Opp. at 5.) Title VII’s definition of “employee” is 
identical to the FLSA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 
U.S.C. § 203. In Robinson v. Shell Oil, the Supreme 
Court found that Title VTI’s definition of “employee” 
was ambiguous as to whether or not it covered indi­
viduals who were fired by their employers and thus 
were now former employees. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
Ultimately the Court determined that Title VII did 
protect the actions of “former employees” in part 
because “Title VII’s definition of “employee” [ ] lacks 
any temporal qualifier and is consistent with either 
current or past employment.” Id. at 342. The Court 
held that the word “employed” could mean, both “is 
employed” but also could just as easily be read to 
mean “was employed.” Id. at 342.
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This approach to interpreting FLSA has been 
used in the Fourth Circuit in Darveau, where the 
Court considered “Title VTI’s authoritative body” of 
case law in analyzing “comparable provisions of other 
federal statutes” including the FLSA. Darveau, 515 
F.3d at 342. Darveau specifically finds that the defini­
tions of “employee” in Title VII and FLSA are identi­
cal. Id. As Defendants argue and is discussed above, 
the Fourth Circuit notes that Robinson, found that 
“employee” included former and current employees 
(those who “are employed” and those who “were 
employed”), but did not find it also included appli­
cants who were never employees.
There are several relevant distinctions between 
the Robinson case and the case at bar. First, in Rob­
inson the Court was trying to determine if an em­
ployee that was fired by an employer could bring a 
FLSA claim against that former employer for subse­
quent discriminatory action. Id. at 339. The Court 
found that “employed” could mean both “is” em­
ployed” or “was” employed, not that “employed” could 
mean “never” employed. See Id. at 342. Furthermore, 
the statute at issue in Robinson, already specifically 
prohibits refusing to hire a job applicant who has 
exercised her Title VII rights in prior employment, no 
such provision exists in the FLSA. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3. Had Congress intended to similarly protect 
job applicants it could have incorporated similar 
language into the anti-retaliation provisions of the 
FLSA.
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Third, Plaintiff argues that other statutes from 
the “same era” as the FLSA, such as the National 
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), should influence this 
Court’s interpretation of the term “employee.” Specifi­
cally, Plaintiff argues that it is similarly unlawful for 
an “employer” to retaliate against an “employee” in 
the NLRA and that “case law interpreting the NLRA” 
indicates that the refusal to hire an applicant for 
employment is contrary to the NLRA. (Opp. at 11 
(citing NLRB v. Lamer Creamery Co., 246 F.2d 8 (5th 
Cir. 1957).) Plaintiff also argues that Fifth Circuit 
case law applying the NLRA protections to a “job 
applicant who is discriminately denied employment 
in violation of the NLRA” should be applied in the 
FLSA context. (Opp. at 11 (citing NLRB v. George D. 
Auchter Co., 209 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1954).)
As Defendant argues, the analogy to NLRB is not 
apt. As an initial matter, the definition of employee 
under the NLRA includes “any employee, and shall 
not be limited to the employees of a particular em­
ployer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other­
wise,” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), rather than the more 
narrow, “an individual employed by an employer” 
used in the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203. This definition 
contemplates a wider sweep of individuals then is 
included in the FLSA’s definition, as it specifically 
states that an employment relationship need not exist 
with a particular employer. Here, while the Plaintiff 
was never hired to work for SAIC, the statute requires 
that the “employee” be “permitted to work” by the 
specific “employer.” See Id.
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that a decision that 
refuses to include job applicants under the definition 
of “employee” would be contrary to the public policy 
purpose of the FLSA as it would have a chilling effect 
on individuals from bringing FLSA actions for fear of 
losing future employment opportunities. Plaintiff 
does not offer any case law where any court ruled on 
this basis. As stated above, Congress could have 
determined that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision 
could apply to “any person” rather than “any employ­
ee,” however, Congress has not made that policy 
determination and this Court will not do so, absent 
Congressional intent.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court will 
grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate 
Order will issue.
____________/s/ ____________
April 2, 2010 James C. Cacheris
Alexandria, Virginia UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT JUDGE
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